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I Comments I
Juvenile Justice? The Increased Propensity
for Juvenile Transfer to the Criminal Court
System in Pennsylvania and the Need for a
Revised Approach to Juvenile Offenders
Anthony R. Holtzman*
I. Introduction
On Thursday, April 24, 2003, fourteen-year-old James Sheets
calmly walked into the Red Lion Junior High School cafeteria in Red
Lion, Pennsylvania.1 Classes were scheduled to start in fifteen minutes,
and the cafeteria was filled with students busily conversing, eating
breakfast, and preparing for class.2 Suddenly and unexpectedly, Sheets
brandished a gun and shot his principal in the chest.3  He then shot
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2005; B.A. Politics, summa cum laude, Messiah College, 2002. The author
would like to thank his parents, Don and Karen Holtzman, his brother, Todd Holtzman,
and his fiancee, Crystal Newcomer, for all their love and support.
1. School Shooting Leaves 2 Dead, THE HOLLAND SENTINEL NAT'L, Apr. 25, 2003,
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himself in the head.4 Both Sheets and his principal died as a result of the
incident.5
Dozens of newspaper articles were written about the Red Lion
school shooting immediately after it occurred. The York Daily Record
alone printed no less than forty articles detailing the shooting and its
aftermath.6 These articles feature headlines such as "All The Precautions
Still Didn't Work,",7 and "Afraid to Go Back: Two Teens Are Afraid to
Return to the School, and Especially the Cafeteria.",8 The latter article
describes two students at Red Lion Junior High School who professed to
be so frightened following the shooting that they vowed to never return
to the school cafeteria, the sight of the tragedy, again. 9 The article ends
with a quote from one of the students' parents, who said, "I'm terrified
because my kid has to go back to school there."'
These newspaper responses illustrate that while incidents of juvenile
violence like the one in Red Lion are indeed disturbing, the media has a
tendency to be sensationalistic and excessive with its coverage of these
stories, striking fear into the hearts of the many Americans who are
justifiably concerned for their safety and for the safety of their children."1
Consequently, Americans operate under the assumption that the juvenile
courts, as a method of controlling juvenile crime rates and reforming
juvenile 12 offenders, have failed. 13  Therefore, many Americans,
4. Id.
5. Id. The principal, Eugene Segro, was shot once in the chest and pronounced
dead at the hospital. Id. Sheets died at the scene of the shooting. Id. The shootings were
committed with two different handguns, a .44-caliber weapon and a .22-caliber weapon.
Id.
6. See School Shooting, YORK DAILY REC., available at
http://www.ydr.com/news/rljh-shooting/full/normal/O/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
7. Mike Argento, All the Precautions Still Didn't Work, YoRK DAILY REC., Apr. 29,
2003, available at http://www.ydr.com/story/rljh-shooting/8952/ (last visited Sept. 1,
2004) (remarking that even though the guns used in the Red Lion school shooting were
kept in locked gun safes and the shooter was educated about guns, the shooting was not
prevented).
8. Michelle Canty, Afraid to Go Back: Two Teens are Afraid to Return to the
School, and Especially the Cafeteria, YoRK DAILY REC., Apr. 28, 2003, available at
http://www.ydr.com/story/rljh-shooting/8881/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Lori Robertson, When Children Kill, 20 AM. JOURNALISM REV. 56, 57 (1998).
Sociologists suggest that insensitivity and undue sensationalism occur with respect to
school shootings when newspapers and other media outlets focus too much attention on
the shooting suspect and not enough attention on broad issues such as the nexus between
children and violence. Id. Moreover, the sociologists suggest that sensationalism is
facilitated when certain details of the shootings are not explored sufficiently, which
leaves room for people to invent facts regarding the shooting and, in so doing, to create
an unnecessary panic. Id.
12. A juvenile is a person who has not reached the age, usually eighteen, at which he
is treated as an adult by a state's criminal justice system with respect to each and every
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including many Pennsylvanians, have supported recent state legislation
making it easier and more common to prosecute juvenile offenders in
state criminal court systems rather than in the juvenile courts.
14
Americans broadly assume that placing more juveniles in the
criminal courts will create a "general deterrent effect," which will, in
turn, protect the public by causing a reduction in juvenile crime rates.' 5
However, the increased propensity for the transfer of juvenile offenders
to state criminal court systems has not had a general deterrent effect, as
juvenile crime rates have not decreased since the implementation of
measures increasing the propensity for transfer. 16  Therefore,
Pennsylvania, a Commonwealth that made it easier to place juvenile
offenders in its criminal court system by enacting statutory amendments
in 1996, should repeal these 1996 amendments to the Pennsylvania
Juvenile Code and thereby restore a lower propensity for transfer.
Part II discusses the history and evolution of the juvenile courts in
America. Part III examines recent developments in state juvenile court
systems and describes how the states have made it easier to prosecute
juveniles in criminal courts. Part IV undertakes a case study of
criminal charge brought against him. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 699 (7th ed. 2000).
13. Katherine Hunt Federle, Is There A Jurisprudential Future for the Juvenile
Court?, 564 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POLITICAL AND SOC. Sci. 28, 28 (1999).
Violent acts committed by juveniles undermine public support for and confidence in the
juvenile courts, and also diminish the political viability of separate state juvenile justice
systems. Id. The belief that juvenile crime was increasing and that the juvenile courts
had failed to adequately address the problem reached a head in the mid to late 1990s
when states began enacting measures designed to place an increasing number of juveniles
in their criminal court systems. Id. However, this climax was unfounded because
national juvenile murder arrest rates, violent crime arrest rates, and property crime arrest
rates had plummeted from the early to mid 1990s. Id.
14. Attitudes Toward the Treatment of Juveniles Who Commit Violent Crimes,
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/
(last visited Sept. 1, 2004) (in this 2000 Gallup poll, 65% of those Americans surveyed
said that juveniles between the ages of fourteen and seventeen who commit violent
crimes should be treated the same as adults, while only 24% said that such juveniles
should be given more lenient treatment in a juvenile court; 67% of Republicans in the
survey said that juveniles should be treated the same as adults, as did 60% of Democrats
and 68% of Independents).
15. Does Treating Kids Like Adults Make A Difference?, PBS FRONTLINE, available
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/juvenile/stats/kidslikeadults.html (last
visited Sept. 1, 2004). The general deterrent effect occurs when a prospective juvenile
offender is dissuaded from actually committing a crime by the threat of being subjected
to the same sort of harsh punishment that was meted out to a previously convicted
offender. Id.
16. Ctr. for the Study and Prevention of Violence, CSPV Fact Sheets: Judicial
Waivers: Youth in Adult Courts, CSPV Online, at http://www.colorado.edu/
cspv/publications/factsheets/cspv/FS-008.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2004). Additionally,
juveniles transferred to state criminal court systems are more likely to recidivate, and in
so doing to commit more serious offenses, than juveniles who are prosecuted in the
juvenile courts. Id.
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Pennsylvania, which focuses on the 1996 amendments to the
Pennsylvania Juvenile Code that make it easier to place juvenile
offenders in Pennsylvania's criminal court system, and examines the
correlative lack of reduction in juvenile crime rates. Part V sets forth
additional policy arguments against the increased propensity for the
transfer of juvenile offenders to state criminal court systems. Part VI
concludes by recommending that Pennsylvania repeal the 1996
amendments to its Juvenile Code and thereby restore a lower propensity
for transfer.
II. History of the Juvenile Courts
The juvenile courts are only about one hundred years old, but the
roots of the juvenile court movement can be traced back to the earliest
stages of American history.' 7 Throughout most of the history of the
juvenile courts, a majority of Americans believed that young criminals
should be treated differently from adult criminals.' 8  This belief was
based on the assumption that juveniles were fundamentally different
from adults in their ability to form the criminal intent necessary to
commit crimes, as well as in their responsibility for crimes. 19 Only
recently have many Americans begun to support treating juvenile
criminals in the same manner as adult criminals.20 Generally, deciding
how to process, treat, and detain juveniles has always been a challenge
for Americans."
A. Treatment of Juvenile Offenders in America Prior to the Creation of
the Juvenile Courts
Colonial and post-revolutionary American courts adopted and built
upon the English common law rules of criminal law and criminal
procedure. 22  By the early nineteenth century, a special substantive
17. FRANCIS BARRY MCCARTHY, PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 3 (The Harrison Co., 2d ed. 1992).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 89 (1999). The 1990s were a time of
unprecedented change in juvenile justice in America. Id. Between 1992 and 1997, all
but three states changed their laws in order to (i) make it easier to transfer juveniles from
their juvenile court systems to their criminal court systems; (ii) expand juvenile
sentencing options; or (iii) modify or remove traditional juvenile code confidentiality
provisions. Id.
21. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 3.
22. PAUL W. TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 171 (McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1st
ed. 1949). The precedents of a harshly punitive common law were carried over from
England. Id. For example, in the Plymouth Colony, capital punishment was used in
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doctrine developed in American criminal courts to govern the
prosecution of children.23 Under this doctrine, each child's "capacity" to
commit the crime of which he was accused had to be ascertained and
considered.24 A child whom a criminal court determined did not have the
capacity to commit an offense was released without consequence under
what was known as the "infancy defense., 25 For purposes of the infancy
defense, children were divided into three categories. First, the courts
indicated that children under the age of seven had absolutely no capacity
for crime.26 Second, the courts determined that children over the age of
fourteen had full capacity for crime, and held them to the same standard
as adults in establishing a defense.27 Third, the courts presumed that
children between the ages of seven and fourteen lacked the capacity to
commit an offense, but this presumption could be rebutted in certain
instances.28
In addition to substantive allowances, special rules of procedure
were developed in colonial and post-revolutionary America to ensure
that children received a fair trial. 29  For example, the criminal courts
recognized that children were more susceptible to external pressures than
adults, and thus required a more thorough analysis of the circumstances
in which juvenile confessions were obtained to avoid coerced
confessions.3 °
As the special procedural rules governing the prosecution of
children developed, many states also enacted statutes creating special
offenses applicable only to children.31 Offenses of this type are now
known as "status offenses.,32 The early status offense measures usually
targeted youthful misbehavior and parental defiance.33
connection with sixteen different offenses. Id.
23. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 3.
24. H. TED RUBIN, JUVENILE JUSTICE: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 52-53 (McGraw-
Hill Book Co., Inc., 2d ed. 1985). A child who had the "capacity" to commit a crime was
one who was capable of forming criminal intent. Id.
25. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 3.
26. RUBIN, supra note 24, at 52-53. The idea that all children under the age of seven
were unable to form criminal intent was derived from an old English common law
principle, and was thus not entirely unique to American courts. Id.
27. Id. at 53.
28. Id. The presumption could be rebutted if, for example, it appeared to the court
and the jury that the child in question could discern between good and evil. Id.
29. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 4.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 405 (MacMillan
Publishing Co., 3d ed. 1991). Contemporary status offenses include incorrigibility,
running away from home, unruliness, school truancy, disregard for or abuse of lawful
parental authority, and repeated use of alcoholic beverages. Id.
33. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 4. Two such statutes, measures enacted in
20041
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Eventually, juveniles convicted of crimes began to be detained in a
manner different from their adult counterparts.34  The public was
concerned that confining children in jails with adult criminals, or in
almshouses 35 with paupers, only served to make the children themselves
criminals and paupers.36 Therefore, places known as houses of refuge,
houses of reformation, or reform schools were founded to keep young
offenders separate from adults in the hope that they would learn to lead
productive lives. 37 State statutes eventually authorized criminal courts to
38 isiuinplace juvenile offenders in these institutions. As the institutions
developed over the years, they ultimately spurred the inception of the
juvenile courts.
39
B. The Establishment and Development of the Juvenile Courts
In 1899, Illinois enacted the Illinois Juvenile Court Act,40 which is
generally credited for establishing America's first juvenile courts. 41 The
Illinois statute served as a model in other states, and within a short time
42virtually every state had established its own juvenile court system.
Pennsylvania's juvenile court system was established in 1901, two years
after the Illinois juvenile court system, with the passage of the
Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Act.43
When the juvenile courts were established, they were given broad
powers of intervention, and were intended to act on the basis of parens
Connecticut in 1642 and Massachusetts in 1646, continue to have great influence on state
juvenile code provisions governing status offenses based on incorrigibility. Id.
34. RUBIN, supra note 24, at 53.
35. Almshouses were dwellings for the publicly or privately supported poor of a city
or county. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 61 (7th ed. 2000).
36. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 7.
37. DEAN J. CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: DELINQUENCY, PROCESSING,
AND THE LAW 10 (Prentice Hall, 1992). The first house of refuge was established in New
York in 1825. Id. The houses of refuge, houses of reformation, and reform schools were
institutions largely devoted to managing juvenile status offenders, who were usually
runaways or incorrigible children. Id. Mandatory education and other forms of training
and assistance were provided to children in these institutions. Id. Many of the juvenile
offenders who were sent to such institutions were the offspring of immigrants. Id.
38. See, e.g., 1824 N.Y. Laws 126, amended by 1826 N.Y. Laws 24.
39. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 7.
40. 1899 Ill. Laws 131.
41. SIMONSEN, supra note 32, at 228-29. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act brought
every type of juvenile case under one jurisdiction and created features that have since
characterized most of the juvenile court systems in the United States. Id.
42. Id. at 229. Within twelve years after the enactment of the Illinois Juvenile Court
Act, twenty-two states had followed Illinois' example and created juvenile court systems,
and by 1925 all but two states had juvenile court systems. Id. By 1945, those two
states-Maine and Wyoming-had joined. Id.
43. 1901 Pa. Laws 279.
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patriae4 to help rehabilitate children in need.45 Neither the guilt nor
blameworthiness of the parent or the child was an issue of great
concern. 46 Rather, the courts attempted to function with the mentality of
a medical clinic, so that a child's problem could be "diagnosed" and
"treated. 'A 7 The juvenile court judges sought to act as parents and do
what was in each juvenile offender's best interests, whether that was
placing the child in a juvenile detention home or requiring the child to
meet regularly with a parole officer.48 Accordingly, the juvenile court
judges were only slightly more legally encumbered than private citizen-
parents.49
The juvenile courts operated in this generally unrestrained fashion
until the 1960s. At that time, the lack of procedural protections in many
states' juvenile court proceedings were increasingly seen as unjustifiable
denials of basic civil rights.5 °
C. Federal Activity Regarding Juvenile Justice
Beginning in 1966, a series of decisions by the United States
Supreme Court infused a variety of procedural requirements into juvenile
court proceedings and greatly altered the operation of the juvenile courts.
44. RUBIN, supra note 24, at 54. Parens patriae is often defined as "substitute
parents." Id. The concept of parens patriae was transplanted from the English courts of
equity, where it had been introduced to protect the property interests and guardianship
needs of children. Id. Parens patriae was consistent with both the broad scope of




47. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 13.
48. RUBIN, supra note 24, at 54. The writings of early juvenile court judges reflect
that the judges were intimately familiar with their cases, possessed an enormous
commitment to helping children, were interested in reforming social institutions to make
them less oppressive to children, and were disinterested in legal procedures and
safeguards. Id. These writings likewise reveal the philosophy of the early juvenile
courts: that intervention with a dependent or neglected child would prevent what is now
know as a status offense, that court-ordered supervision of status offenders would
eliminate or reduce juvenile delinquency, and that programs for juvenile delinquents
would prevent them from later becoming criminals. Id.
49. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 13.
50. CHAMPION, supra note 37, at 303. Until the mid-1960s, juvenile courts had
considerable procedural latitude in regulating the affairs of minors. Id. The freedom to
act on the child's behalf pursuant to the doctrine of parens patriae had largely gone
unchallenged. Id. Juveniles who entered state juvenile court systems were not advised of
their right to legal representation, to have an attorney present during any interrogation, or
to remain silent. Id. They could be questioned at length without any notification being
given to their parents. Id. Generally, they had little, if any, protections against violations
of adult constitutional rights that were committed by law enforcement officers and others.
Id. at 303-04.
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In Kent v. United States,51 regarded as the first major juvenile rights
decision, the Supreme Court held that Fourteenth Amendment procedural
due process 52 requires that waiver hearings be conducted in state juvenile
courts before juveniles can be transferred to the jurisdiction of state
criminal court systems. 53 The Court also held that juveniles are entitled
to consult with counsel prior to and during such hearings.
54
Kent was followed by In re Gault55 in 1967, which is perhaps the
most noteworthy of all juvenile rights cases. In Gault, the Court held
that Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process56 gives juveniles the
right to adequate notice of all charges brought against them in state
juvenile and criminal courts,57 as well as the right to assistance of
counsel in all juvenile court delinquency proceedings.58  Moreover, the
Court held that the Fifth Amendment, 59 as applied to the states through
60the Fourteenth Amendment, gives juveniles the right against self-
incrimination. 6 1  Additionally, the Court held that the Sixth
51. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
52. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
53. Kent, 383 U.S. at 561.
54. Id. The Court stated that a juvenile's right to counsel in waiver hearings is "of
the essence of justice," and that the appointment of counsel to a juvenile without
affording him an opportunity for a hearing is equivalent to an outright denial of counsel.
Id. The Court reprimanded a District of Columbia juvenile court for its failure to grant a
waiver hearing prior to transferring a juvenile to the District of Columbia criminal court
system in a case where the transfer decision was made at the discretion of the juvenile
court judge. Id. at 561-62.
55. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra text accompanying note 52.
57. Gault, 387 U.S. at 33. The Court indicated that notice of charges against
juvenile defendants must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled juvenile court
proceedings so that the defendants can adequately prepare for those proceedings. Id.
Also, the notice must "set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity." Id.
58. Id. at 36. A juvenile delinquency proceeding is a proceeding by which a juvenile
court determines whether a juvenile is guilty of criminal behavior that is punishable in the
juvenile court system by special juvenile laws and penalties not pertaining to adults.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 699 (7th ed. 2000). The Gault Court's decision to extend the
right to counsel in all juvenile delinquency proceedings was influenced by the need to
ensure evenhandedness in such proceedings, which involve "the awesome prospect of [a
juvenile's] incarceration in a state institution until the juvenile reaches the age of 21."
Gault, 387 U.S. at 36-37. Also, the Court noted that at the time of its decision, one-third
of the states provided for the right to counsel in all delinquency proceedings. Id. at 38.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing, in pertinent part, that a person may not "be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself').
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
61. Gault, 387 U.S. at 55. The Court further held that if a juvenile's counsel was
absent when a confession was obtained, then a reviewing court must be careful to ensure
that the confession was voluntary, not only in the sense that it was uncoerced, but also




62Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment,63 gives juveniles the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses when they are involved in criminal court proceedings.64
Federal activity regarding juvenile rights continued throughout the
1970s. In re Winship,65 decided in 1970 on the heels of Gault, was
another landmark case. In Winship, the Court held that Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process66 requires the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard to be used by juvenile court judges in establishing a
child's delinquency, rather than the "preponderance of the evidence"
standard, which had previously been utilized in many states.67
After having extended various rights to juveniles in preceding cases,
the Supreme Court denied juveniles the right to a jury trial in 1971, in
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania.68  The Court held that the Sixth
Amendment,69 as applied to the states by the Fourteenth, 70 does not
require a trial by jury in the adjudicative stage of all state juvenile court
proceedings.7'
Following McKeiver, Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act 72 in 1974 as a response to national concern
regarding growing juvenile crime rates. 3  This Act authorized the
establishment of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
62. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him").
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
64. Gault, 387 U.S. at 57.
65. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra text accompanying note 52.
67. Winship, 397 U.S. at 368. The Court reasoned that the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard is necessary in juvenile court delinquency proceedings because
children who are found guilty in such proceedings are subjected to loss of liberty in much
the same way as adults convicted of criminal offenses. Id. at 366. The Court rejected the
idea that affording juveniles the protection of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would
jeopardize the beneficial and unique aspects of state juvenile court systems. Id.
68. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
69. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing, in pertinent part, that "[in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy a right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed").
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
71. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545. The Court reasoned that a mandatory trial by jury
would risk turning each juvenile court proceeding into a fully adversary process and
would "put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of intimate, informal
protective proceedings." Id. Moreover, the Court indicated that there is nothing to
prevent a juvenile court judge from using an advisory jury in appropriate situations. Id.
at 548.
72. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5784
(1974).
73. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 20, at
87-88.
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
Prevention ("OJJDP"),7 4 which has been influential in providing
information about juvenile crime and its prevention.75 In addition, the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act allocates federal funds
to state juvenile research, rehabilitation, and delinquency prevention
programs, and authorizes the OJJDP to distribute these funds.76 Finally,
in 1975, the Supreme Court held in Breed v. Jones77 that the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 78 as applied to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment,79 forbids prosecuting a person in a state criminal
court system for the same offense for which he had previously been tried
in a juvenile court .
III. Recent Developments in State Juvenile Court Systems
A. The General Movement Towards Punishment
The Supreme Court has heard several other cases involving the
rights of juveniles since Breed v. Jones,8' but most of the law governing
juvenile offenders has been formulated by the states. Until the early
1990s, most state statutes remained focused on prosecuting juvenile
offenders in juvenile courts and treating them in juvenile facilities. 82 In
74. 42 U.S.C. § 5611.
75. CHAMPION, supra note 37, at 54. In 1975, the OJJDP assumed responsibility for
acquiring juvenile court dispositional records from the states and periodically publishing
statistical reports concerning juvenile offenses and adjudicatory outcomes. Id.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 5631 (giving the OJJDP authority to make grants and contracts to
improve state juvenile justice systems); 42 U.S.C. § 5632 (outlining how funds are to be
allocated by the OJJDP to the states each fiscal year).
77. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
78. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
80. Jones, 421 U.S. at 541. The Court noted that in some cases, a juvenile who is
tried in a state criminal court system for the same offense for which he had previously
been tried in a juvenile court does not face the risk of more than one punishment. Id. at
532. The Court indicated that even in these cases the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated,
because it exists to prevent both the risk of more than one punishment for the same
offense and the risk of more than one trial for the same offense. Id.
81. E.g., Fare v. Michael, 442 U.S. 707, 724 (1979) (holding that a juvenile's request
to speak with his probation officer does not constitute a per se invocation of his Fifth
Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268
(1984) (holding that pre-trial detention of juveniles charged with crimes does not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
380 (1989) (holding that the imposition of capital punishment on an individual for a
crime committed at sixteen or seventeen years of age does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
82. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 20, at
89. In addition, until the early 1990s, public resources were channeled into community-
based programs intended to rehabilitate juvenile offenders and diversionary programs
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the early 1990s, however, a period of great change in juvenile justice
began in America. Perceptions of a juvenile crime epidemic fueled
public scrutiny of the ability of state juvenile court systems to control
juvenile crime rates and rehabilitate young offenders. 83 Almost every
state in America began to make juvenile crime and juvenile court
procedures a major focus of the political process,84 and statutes
governing juvenile offenders have since changed dramatically. The
statutory changes represent an effort by legislators to drastically curb
juvenile crime.85
In their effort to become more stringent towards juvenile offenders,
many states have amended the "purpose clause" located within each of
their juvenile codes to balance or replace rehabilitation with punishment
86or accountability as the primary goal of their juvenile court systems.
Although purpose clauses do not usually have significant substantive
impact, they provide a philosophical foundation that influences the way
juvenile courts and participants in juvenile court proceedings view their
roles and functions.87
Substantive impact is certainly present, however, in another set of
statutory changes recently implemented in many states regarding the
placement of juvenile offenders in state criminal court systems. Since
1992, nearly every state has enacted or amended statutory transfer
provisions, making it significantly easier to prosecute juveniles in
criminal courts.88
B. Placement of Juvenile Offenders in State Criminal Court Systems
There are generally four ways in which statutes facilitate the
transfer of juvenile offenders to state criminal court systems. The first
way a juvenile can be transferred to a state criminal court system is
intended to dissuade children from adopting criminal lifestyles. Id. at 88.
83. COALITION FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 30-31 (1999).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 20, at
89. Pennsylvania, for example, added the phrases "attention to the protection of the
community" and "the imposition of accountability for offenses committed" to the
purpose clause of its Juvenile Code. Compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301(b)(2) (1995)
with 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301(b)(2) (2000).
87. See, e.g., In re McDonough, 430 A.2d 308, 312 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (remarking
that the purpose clause of the Pennsylvania juvenile code indicates that "the
Commonwealth's role [in its juvenile justice system] is twofold: to protect the public
interest, and to supervise and rehabilitate youthful offenders").
88. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 20, at
89. By 1997, all but six states had made changes to statutory transfer provisions in order
to make it easier to transfer juvenile offenders from their juvenile justice systems to their
criminal justice systems. Id.
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through a statutory exclusion provision. Such a provision
automatically and entirely excludes a group of enumerated criminal
charges from juvenile court jurisdiction.90 Second, a juvenile can be
transferred to a state criminal court system through a mandatory waiver
provision. 9 A mandatory waiver provision requires juvenile courts to
exclude certain enumerated charges, and therefore is closely related to a
statutory exclusion provision.92 In contrast to a statutory exclusion
provision, however, a mandatory waiver provision requires juvenile
courts to receive a case initially, conduct a preliminary hearing to ensure
that the provision applies, and then, upon determining that it applies,
issue an order transferring the case to a criminal court. 9 3 Third, transfer
to a state criminal court system can occur by the operation of a
discretionary waiver provision, which gives juvenile court judges the
discretion, after first considering a list of enumerated factors, to waive a
juvenile court's jurisdiction over individual cases in which a juvenile is
charged with certain crimes. 94 Finally, juveniles can be transferred to a
state criminal court system by way of a presumptive waiver provision.95
Such a provision creates the presumption that a certain group of
enumerated criminal charges are best suited for prosecution in criminal
court. 9 6 However, a juvenile facing one of these charges can attempt to
rebut the presumption.97
Most states have recently made it easier to transfer juveniles to their
adult criminal court systems by adding to the list of charges that are
statutorily excluded from juvenile court handling, changing the criteria to
be considered when a transfer decision is made under their discretionary
89. Nat'l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, State Profiles: Glossary, NCJJ State Profiles
Online, at http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/asp/glossary.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2004).
90. Id. For example, California's statutory exclusion provision excludes from the
state's juvenile court system all charges of rape and sodomy or oral copulation brought
against a juvenile age 14 or older. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602(b) (West Supp.
2003).
91. Nat'l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, State Profiles Glossary, supra note 89.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. For example, in Vermont, a juvenile court faced with a discretionary waiver
decision considers, among other things, the maturity of the juvenile, the extent of his
prior record of delinquency, the nature of past efforts to treat him, his response to past
treatment efforts, and his culpability at the time he committed the alleged offense. See
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5506(d) (2001).
95. Nat'l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, State Profiles Glossary, supra note 89.
96. Id.
97. Id. In California, the presumption can be rebutted if the juvenile convinces the
reviewing juvenile court that he is not criminally sophisticated, is amenable to
rehabilitation prior to the age of twenty-one, has little or no previous delinquent history,
has been rehabilitated successfully by a juvenile court in the past, or committed the
offense of which he is accused in sympathetic circumstances or in a manner that was not
particularly egregious. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a)(2) (West Supp. 2003).
[Vol. 109:2
JUVENILE JUSTICE?
waiver provisions, increasing the number of charges that may be
transferred through discretionary and presumptive waiver provisions, or
lowering the age at which juveniles are subject to transfer. 98 A broad
assumption lies behind the recent state legislation making it easier to
prosecute juveniles in criminal courts. The assumption is that placing
juveniles in state criminal court systems will create a general deterrent
effect on juvenile offenders, which will, in turn, protect the public by
causing a reduction in juvenile crime rates. 99
IV. Case Study of Juvenile Transfer in Pennsylvania
A. The Increased Propensity for Juvenile Transfer in Pennsylvania
As with many other states, Pennsylvania recently implemented
measures that make it significantly easier to place a greater number of
juveniles'00 in its criminal court system.10 1 Pennsylvania's increased
propensity for transfer came in the form of Act 33, which was enacted in
March of 1996.102 Act 33 made changes to the preexisting Pennsylvania
Juvenile Code, 10 3 specifically to the purpose clause, the statutory
exclusion provision, the discretionary waiver provision, and the
presumptive waiver provision. 104
With respect to Pennsylvania's Juvenile Code purpose clause, one
notable change was made to the pre-1996 purpose clause with the
enactment of Act 33. Prior to 1996, the purpose clause provided that one
of the purposes of the Commonwealth's juvenile court system was,
"[c]onsistent with the protection of the public interest, to remove from
98. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 20, at
88.
99. Does Treating Kids Like Adults Make A Difference?, supra note 15.
100. In Pennsylvania, a juvenile is defined as an individual who: (i) is under eighteen
years old; (ii) is under twenty-one years old and committed an act of delinquency before
reaching the age of eighteen; or (iii) is adjudicated dependent before reaching the age of
eighteen and, while engaged in a course of instruction or treatment, requests that the
Commonwealth's juvenile court system retain jurisdiction until the course is completed,
provided that he will not remain in the course past the age of twenty-one. 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 6302 para. (1)-(3) (2000) (defining "child").
101. See 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 1995-33 (West).
102. Id.
103. The Pennsylvania juvenile code is codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301 et seq.
104. Compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301(b)(2) (1995) with 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 6301(b)(2) (2000); compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(e) (1995) with 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 6355(e) (2000) and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 para. (2)(i) (2000) (defining
"delinquent act") and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 para. (2)(ii)(A)-(I) (2000) (defining
"delinquent act") and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 para. (2)(iii)(A)-(H) (2000) (defining
"delinquent act"); compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(a)(4)(A) (1995) with 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6355(a)(4)(A)-(G) (2000); and see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(g)(1)-(2)
(2000).
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children committing delinquent acts the consequences of criminal
behavior, and to substitute therefore a program of supervision, care, and
rehabilitation." 10 5 With the enactment of Act 33, this portion of the
purpose clause was changed to read:
Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to provide for
children committing delinquent acts programs of supervision, care,
and rehabilitation which provide balanced attention to the protection
of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses
committed and the development of competencies to enable children to
become responsible and productive members of the community.
10 6
The purpose clause was thus amended to include the phrases
"attention to the protection of the community" and "the imposition of
accountability for offenses committed."10 7  These additions to the
purpose clause suggest a change in the underlying philosophy of the
Pennsylvania juvenile court system. Prior to 1996, the system was
primarily concerned with the rehabilitation of young offenders; however,
the Act 33 amendments place an equal emphasis on accountability and
punishment. This emphasis is most clearly manifested in the Juvenile
Code provisions governing the transfer of juveniles to Pennsylvania's
criminal court system.
Perhaps the greatest change relating to transfer in the Pennsylvania
Juvenile Code occurred in the statutory exclusion provision, which was
expanded to encompass many more charges.108 Prior to the enactment of
Act 33, statutory exclusion applied only to juveniles under the age of
eighteen who were charged with murder.109 Juveniles charged with
murder continue to be excluded from Pennsylvania's juvenile court
system.110 However, statutory exclusion now also applies to juveniles
who were between the ages of fifteen and eighteen at the time of their
alleged criminal conduct and who are charged with using a deadly
weapon while committing rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,
aggravated assault, robbery, robbery of a motor vehicle, aggravated
indecent assault, kidnapping, voluntary manslaughter, or attempting,
105. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301(b)(2) (1995).
106. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301(b)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
107. Compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301(b)(2) (1995) with 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 6301(b)(2) (2000).
108. Compare 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(e) (1995) with 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 6355(e) (2000) and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 para. (2)(i) (2000) (defining "delinquent
act") and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 para. (2)(ii)(A)-(I) (2000) (defining "delinquent
act") and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 para. (2)(iii)(A)-(H) (2000) (defining "delinquent
act").
109. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(e) (1995).
110. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(e) (2000); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 para. (2)(i)
(2000) (defining "delinquent act").
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conspiring, or soliciting to commit any of these crimes or to commit
murder." ' Also, juveniles who were between the ages of fifteen and
eighteen at the time of their alleged criminal conduct and who are
charged with any of the aforementioned offenses, and who have
previously been adjudicated delinquent1 2 of any such offenses, except
for aggravated assault, are statutorily excluded from Pennsylvania's
juvenile court system.
11 3
In addition to the increase in the number of criminal charges subject
to statutory exclusion in Pennsylvania, the factors considered by the
Commonwealth's juvenile courts when deciding whether to effect
transfer pursuant to the discretionary waiver provision became more
punishment-oriented. Prior to 1996, a juvenile age fourteen or older at
the time of his alleged criminal conduct could be transferred to the
Pennsylvania criminal court pursuant to the discretionary waiver
provision if he was charged with a felony not statutorily excluded from
the juvenile courts, and a juvenile court determined him to be unfit for
treatment in available juvenile facilities. 11 4 This determination was based
upon consideration of the juvenile's age, mental capacity, maturity,
degree of criminal sophistication, previous records, nature and extent of
any prior delinquent history, probation or institution reports, nature and
circumstances of charges, and likelihood of rehabilitation. 15 In 1996,
however, the discretionary waiver provision was amended to require
Pennsylvania's juvenile courts to consider the following additional
factors: (i) the impact of the juvenile's offense on the victim(s); (ii) the
impact of the offense on the community; (iii) the threat to the safety of
the public or any individual posed by the juvenile; (iv) the degree of the
juvenile's culpability; and (v) the adequacy and duration of the
dispositional alternatives available in the criminal courts. 1 6  These
111. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(e) (2000); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 para.
(2)(ii)(A)-(I) (2000) (defining "delinquent act").
112. In Pennsylvania, a juvenile who is adjudicated delinquent is one who is "ten
years of age or older whom the [reviewing juvenile] court has found to have committed a
delinquent act and is in need of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation." 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 6302 (2000) (defining "delinquent child"). A "delinquent act" is defined as "an
act designated a crime under the law of [the] Commonwealth, or of another state if the act
occurred in that state, or under Federal law, or under local ordinances or an act which
constitutes indirect criminal contempt under 23 PA. CONS. STAT. CH. 61 (relating to
protection from abuse)." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 para. (1) (2000) (defining
"delinquent act"). This definition is subject to various exceptions. 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 6302 para. (2) (2000) (defining "delinquent act").
113. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(e) (2000); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 para.
(2)(iii)(A)-(H) (2000) (defining "delinquent act").
114. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(a)(4)(A) (1995).
115. Id.
116. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(a)(4)(A)-(G) (2000).
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additional factors are clearly more conducive to placing a juvenile in
Pennsylvania's criminal court system, and reflect a more punitive
attitude towards juveniles charged with crimes.
Act 33 also made transfer more prominent in Pennsylvania by
creating presumptive waiver. The presumptive waiver provision created
by Act 33 indicates that, in certain situations, a juvenile is presumed to
be best suited for prosecution in the Pennsylvania criminal court system,
and the burden of proving that he should not be transferred to a criminal
court rests with the juvenile. " 7 The provision applies, specifically, when
the juvenile was fourteen or older and used a deadly weapon at the time
of his alleged criminal conduct, or was fifteen or older and previously
adjudicated delinquent of a felony at the time of his alleged criminal
conduct, and there is a prima facie case that he committed rape,
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated assault, robbery,
robbery of a motor vehicle, aggravated indecent assault, kidnapping,
voluntary manslaughter, an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit
any of these offenses, or an attempt to commit murder." 
8
Finally, Act 33 increased the propensity for the transfer of juveniles
to the criminal court system in Pennsylvania by instituting a "once an
adult, always an adult" provision. 119 This provision ensures that once a
juvenile has been adjudicated guilty in a proceeding in the
Commonwealth's criminal court system, he will automatically be tried as
an adult when any subsequent criminal charges are brought against
him. 120
Clearly, the Pennsylvania Juvenile Code has become more punitive
in its philosophy regarding juvenile offenders and more expansive in its
ability to place juveniles in Pennsylvania's criminal court system since
the implementation of Act 33 in 1996. However, these changes have not
served their intended primary purpose of reducing juvenile crime rates in
the Commonwealth.
B. Pennsylvania Juvenile Crime Statistics
Pennsylvania juvenile crime statistics indicate that the increased
propensity for the transfer of juvenile offenders to Pennsylvania's
criminal court system has not had a general deterrent effect on juvenile
offenders, as juvenile crime rates have not decreased in Pennsylvania
after the implementation of Act 33.
In order to understand Act 33's relationship to Pennsylvania
117. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(g) (2000).
118. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(g)(1)-(2) (2000).




juvenile crime statistics, it is useful to first examine the Pennsylvania
juvenile population before the enactment of Act 33 in 1996, as well as
after its enactment. The average juvenile population in Pennsylvania
from 1993-1995 was 2,932,602 .21 The population of juveniles in 1996
was 2,945,567.122 The population of juveniles in 1999 was 2,943,906.123
The population of juveniles in 2000 was 2,896,337.124 And, the
population of juveniles in 2002 was 2,863,452.125 Thus, the population
of juveniles in Pennsylvania increased between 1993-1996 and then
steadily decreased from 1996-2002. Table 1.1, which follows, illustrates
this occurrence.
Table 1.1: PA Juvenile Population
Year Population
1993-95 2,932,602




Given that the juvenile population decreased after the enactment of
Act 33 in 1996, it is notable that both the number of juvenile arrests and
the juvenile arrest rates 126 in Pennsylvania were greater after the
enactment of Act 33 than before, indicating the absence of a general
deterrent effect. The average number of juvenile arrests per year from
1993-1995 was 103,008.127 The average yearly juvenile arrest rate
during that period was 3512.5.128 The number of juvenile arrests in 1996
was 115,979.129 The juvenile arrest rate that year was 3937.41 30 The
121. Nat'l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Persons Under Age 18 Population Trends,
Pennsylvania Electronic Juvenile Justice Databook, at http://ncjj.servehttp.com/
padatabook/population.asp?County=5300&table=POPAGE 1 &hid-year = 1996&hid-type





126. The juvenile arrest rate for a given year is calculated based on the number of
juvenile arrests in that year per 100,000 juveniles.
127. Nat'l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Arrests by Age in State of Pennsylvania,
Pennsylvania Electronic Juvenile Justice Databook , at http://ncjj.servehttp.com/
padatabook/arrest-trend.asp?County=5300&table=ARAGE&hid-year-1998&hidtype=
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number of juvenile arrests in 1999 was 106,997.131 The juvenile arrest
rate that year was 3634.5.132 The number of juvenile arrests in 2000 was
107,284.' The juvenile arrest rate that year was 3704.1.134 And, the
number of juvenile arrests in 2002 was 105,397.135 The juvenile arrest
rate that year was 3680.8.136 As Table 1.2 illustrates, juvenile arrest rates
in Pennsylvania were higher after the enactment of Act 33 despite the
increased propensity for transfer to the adult court.
Table 1.2: PA Juvenile Arrest Rates
Year Arrest Rate
1993-95 3512.5




Intriguing trends are also apparent with respect to the number of
delinquency cases and the delinquency case rates 13 in Pennsylvania. As
with juvenile arrest rates, delinquency case rates have not declined since
the enactment of Act 33 in 1996, which likewise indicates the absence of
a general deterrent effect. The average number of delinquency cases
heard per year by Pennsylvania's juvenile courts from 1993-1995 was
34,839.138 The average yearly delinquency case rate during that period
was 1188.0.139 The number of delinquency cases in 1996 was 35,619.140
The delinquency case rate that year was 1209.2.141 The number of
delinquency cases in 1999 was 40,763.142 The delinquency case rate that







137. The juvenile delinquency case rate for a given year is calculated based on the
number of delinquency cases in that year per 100,000 juveniles.
138. Nat'l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Most Serious Offense Disposed in State of
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Electronic Juvenile Justice Databook, at
http://ncjj.servehttp.com/padatabook/jcs.asp?County=5300&table=JCOFF-Total&hid-ye








41,773.144 The delinquency case rate that year was 1442.3.14' These
figures show that delinquency case rates rose steadily in Pennsylvania
despite the increased threat of transfer to the adult court. 14 6 Table 1.3,
which follows, reflects this trend.
Table 1.3: PA Delinquency Case Rates
Year Delinquency Case Rate
1993-95 1188.0
1996 (Act 33) 1209.2
1999 1384.7
2000 1442.3
Additionally, as with delinquency case rates in general, delinquency
case rates for person offenses, 147 such as homicide, violent sex offenses,
robbery, aggravated assault, simple assault, and nonviolent sex
offenses, 148 did not decline in Pennsylvania after the enactment of Act 33
in 1996. This is especially indicative of the absence of a general
deterrent effect, inasmuch as charges for person offenses are those most
likely to be transferred to the adult criminal court. 14 9  The average
number of delinquency cases for person offenses heard per year by
Pennsylvania's juvenile courts from 1993-1995 was 9,612.150 The
average yearly delinquency case rate for person offenses during that
period was 327.8.151 The number of delinquency cases for person
144. Id
145. Id.
146. Post-2000 Pennsylvania statistics regarding yearly quantities of delinquency
cases and yearly delinquency case rates are presently unavailable.
147. The juvenile delinquency case rate for person offenses for a given year is
calculated based on the number of delinquency cases for person offenses in that year per
100,000 juveniles.
148. A person offense is a crime against the body of another human being. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 886 (7th ed. 2000). The common-law person offenses were murder,
manslaughter, mayhem, rape, assault, battery, robbery, false imprisonment, abortion,
seduction, kidnapping, and abduction. Id.
149. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(e) (2000); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 para. (2)(i)
(2000) (defining "delinquent act"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 para. (2)(ii)(A)-(I) (2000)
(defining "delinquent act"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 para. (2)(iii)(A)-(H) (2000)
(defining "delinquent act"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(a)(4)(A)-(G) (2000); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6355(g)(1)-(2) (2000).
150. Nat'l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Most Serious Offense Disposed in State of
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Electronic Juvenile Justice Databook , at
http://ncjj.servehttp.com/padatabook/jcs.aspCounty=5300&table=JCOFF Total&hid-ye
ar= 1 996&hid-type= I &hid_perc=&hidjtrend=&Print=yes (last updated July 2003).
151. Id.
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offenses in 1996 was 8,991.152 The delinquency case rate for person
offenses that year was 305.2.153 The number of delinquency cases for
person offenses in 1999 was 12,159.1 4 The delinquency case rate for
person offenses that year was 413.0.15 And, the number of delinquency
cases for person offenses in 2000 was 12,629.156 The delinquency case
rate for person offenses that year was 436.0.' 5' These figures show that
the delinquency case rate for person offenses rose in Pennsylvania
despite the increased threat of transfer to the adult court.158 Table 1.4,
which follows, illustrates this trend.
Table 1.4: PA Delinquency Case Rates: Person Offenses
Year Case Rate: Person Offenses
1993-95 327.8
1996 (Act 33) 305.2
1999 413.0
2000 436.0
The increased propensity for the transfer of juvenile offenders to the
adult criminal court system in Pennsylvania has not had a general
deterrent effect on juvenile offenders, as juvenile arrest rates and
delinquency case rates, including delinquency case rates for person
offenses, have not decreased in Pennsylvania since the implementation of
Act 33.
V. Additional Policy Arguments Against the Increased Propensity for
Juvenile Transfer
In addition to the fact that the increased propensity for the transfer
of juvenile offenders to Pennsylvania's criminal court system has not had
a general deterrent effect, there are other significant policy arguments
against the increased propensity for juvenile transfer.
A. Recidivism







158. Post-2000 Pennsylvania statistics regarding yearly quantities of delinquency




inflicted upon juveniles by criminal courts have not deterred juveniles
prosecuted in state criminal court systems from recidivating upon being
released into society. 159  In fact, these studies show that after their
release, juveniles prosecuted in state criminal court systems tend to
reoffend sooner and more often than those prosecuted in the juvenile
courts. 160  One such study was conducted by Columbia University
researcher Jeffrey Fagan, who examined juvenile offenders in New York
and New Jersey.' 6 ' Another was conducted by Northwestern University
researcher Donna Bishop and her colleagues, who examined juvenile
offenders in Florida.
62
The Fagan study compared fifteen and sixteen-year-old juveniles
who were charged with robbery and burglary 163 in four similar
communities in New York and New Jersey. 164 At the time of the study,
these states had similar statutes for first and second-degree robbery and
first-degree burglary. 165  However, in New York, the juveniles were
prosecuted in the state criminal court system, while in New Jersey they
were prosecuted in the state juvenile court system. 166  The sample of
159. Does Treating Kids Like Adults Make A Difference?, supra note 15. In addition
to indicating that the increased propensity for juvenile transfer has not stunted recidivism,
research suggests that juveniles convicted in state criminal court systems, particularly
violent offenders, are more likely to be incarcerated and receive longer sentences than
juveniles retained in state juvenile court systems. Id.
160. Id.
161. Jeffrey Fagan, The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court
Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 LAW & POL'Y 77
(1996).
162. Donna Bishop et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does it Make
a Difference?, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 171 (1996).
163. Robbery is the illegal taking of property from the person of another, or in the
person's presence, by violence or intimidation. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (7th ed.
2000). Burglary is the breaking and entering of any building with the intent to commit a
felony. Id. at 157.
164. Fagan, supra note 161, at 84-85. The study compared juveniles from two
northern New Jersey counties with matched samples of juveniles from two counties in
southeastern New York state. Id. at 84. The four counties are part of the same
metropolitan area and regional economy, and have similar demographic, social, and
cultural features. Id. at 84-85. The risk factors for juvenile delinquency are comparable
in all four counties. Id. at 85.
165. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160.15 (McKinney 1995) with N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:15-1(a) and (b) (West 1995); compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160.10 (McKinney 1995)
with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:15-1(a) and (b) (West 1995); compare N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 140.30 (McKinney 1995) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 18-2(a) and (b) (West 1995).
166. Fagan, supra note 161, at 86. Under the applicable New York statutes, juveniles
charged with first or second-degree robbery and first-degree burglary were automatically
excluded from the state juvenile court system and prosecuted in the state criminal court
system. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20(42) (McKinney 1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 180.75(3)(a) (McKinney 1995). In New Jersey, on the other hand, these charges
originated in the state juvenile court system. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-24(a) (West
1995). In order to avoid dismissals prior to arraignment, the cases used in the study were
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juveniles used in the study consisted of 400 robbery offenders and 400
burglary offenders who were randomly selected.
1 67
Fagan examined the recidivism rates of the juvenile offenders from
New York and New Jersey after their release.1 68 He found that while
there were no significant differences in recidivism between burglary
offenders prosecuted in the New York criminal court system and those
prosecuted in the New Jersey juvenile court system, 169 there were notable
differences in recidivism among robbery offenders.1 70  Seventy-six
percent of robbery offenders prosecuted in the New York criminal court
system were subsequently re-arrested, as compared to only 67% of those
prosecuted in the New Jersey juvenile court system.17 1 Moreover, 56%
of those prosecuted in the New York criminal court system were
subsequently reincarcerated, while only 41% of those prosecuted in the
New Jersey juvenile court system were reincarcerated.1 72  And, those
prosecuted in the New York criminal court system who reoffended did so
sooner after their release than those prosecuted in the New Jersey
juvenile court system. 173
Similar results were evident in the Bishop study. Bishop compared
the recidivism rates of 2,738 juvenile offenders who were transferred to
the criminal court system in Florida with a similarly situated group of
non-transferred juveniles. 174 The study revealed that although juveniles
selected only after charges were formally filed in the New York criminal courts and the
New Jersey juvenile courts, respectively. Fagan, supra note 161, at 88.
167. Id. A multi-stage sampling procedure resulted in random samples of 200
juvenile offenders from each of the New York and New Jersey counties involved in the
study. Id.
168. Id. at9l-98.
169. Id. at 92. Precisely 80.9% of the burglary offenders prosecuted in the New York
criminal court system were subsequently re-arrested, as compared to 81.3% of those
prosecuted in the New Jersey juvenile court system. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. Moreover, 91% of the juvenile robbery offenders who were sentenced to
incarceration in the New York criminal court system were re-arrested, as compared to
only 73% of the robbery offenders who were sentenced in the New Jersey juvenile court
system. Id. at 93. And, only 64% of the robbery offenders who were sentenced to
probation in the New Jersey juvenile court system were re-arrested, while 81% of the
robbery offenders who were sentenced in the New York criminal court system were re-
arrested. Id.
172. Id. at 92.
173. Id. at 94. The amount of time that elapsed prior to the re-arrest of robbery
offenders sentenced in the New Jersey juvenile court system was over 50% longer than
for robbery offenders sentenced in the New York criminal court system (631 versus 392
days). Id.
174. Bishop, supra note 162, at 176. To ensure that the group of transferred juveniles
was equivalent to the nontransferred juveniles, the Bishop study sampled the
nontransferred juveniles and then employed a matching procedure to control for the
seriousness of the transfer offense, number of charges, number of prior offenses, severity
of prior offenses, and sociodemographic characteristics, such as age, gender, and race.
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prosecuted as adults were more likely to be incarcerated, and
incarcerated for a longer time, than those who remained in the state's
juvenile court system,175 they also had a higher recidivism rate.
1 1
6
Within two years, they were more likely to reoffend,117 to reoffend
earlier, 178 and to commit more serious subsequent offenses 179 than
juveniles prosecuted in the juvenile courts.
B. Developmental Psychology
The increased propensity for juvenile transfer to state criminal court
systems is rash in light of the psychological development of most
juveniles. Researchers have examined the effects of criminal prosecution
and incarceration on juveniles from a developmental perspective.
180
They conclude that because juvenile offenders are in a psychologically
formative period of their lives, exhibit low levels of adjudicative
competence, and are generally less culpable than adult criminals, the
increased propensity for juvenile transfer is, in most cases, unsound
public policy.
1 81
Juvenile transfer to state criminal court systems is unwise in light of
three interrelated aspects of the psychological formation of juveniles.
182
Id. at 175.
175. Id. at 183.
176. Id. The group of juveniles transferred to the Florida criminal court system
recidivated at a higher rate than the nontransferred juveniles in all seven classes of
offenses that were included in the study. Id.
177. Id. at 182. Of the transferred juveniles, 30% were rearrested within two years
after their release, compared to 19% of the matched juveniles who were not transferred.
Id.
178. Id. For those transferred juveniles who reoffended, the average time that elapsed
between their release and reoffending was 135 days, while for the nontransfer group it
was 227 days. Id.
179. Id. Of the transferred juveniles who were rearrested, 93% of the rearrests were
for felony offenses. Id. Of the nontransferred juveniles who were rearrested, 85% of the
rearrests were for felony offenses. Id. at 182-83.
180. See Laurence Steinberg, A Developmental Perspective on Serious Juvenile
Crime: When Should Juveniles be Tried as Adults?, 63 FED. PROB. 52 (1999); see also
David E. Arredondo, Child Development, Children's Mental Health and the Juvenile
Justice System: Principles for Effective Decision Making, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 13
(2003); JULIUS SEGAL, A CHILD'S JOURNEY: FORCES THAT SHAPE THE LIVES OF OUR
YOUNG 46-49 (McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1978).
181. See Arredondo, supra note 180, at 16-17; Steinberg, supra note 180, at 57.
Steinberg proposes that for purposes of juvenile transfer, juvenile offenders should be
grouped into three categories: juveniles (individuals under age thirteen), who should not
be prosecuted in adult courts; adults (individuals age seventeen and older), who should;
and youths (individuals between the ages of thirteen and sixteen), who may or may not be
developmentally appropriate candidates for transfer depending on their individual
characteristics and circumstances. Id.
182. Id. at 53.
2004]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
First, the stage in life during which juveniles are most likely to be
transferred, adolescence, is a transitional time, during which there are
rapid and dramatic changes in the physical, emotional, and social
capabilities of juveniles.183  Second, adolescence is a period of great
adaptability, during which a juvenile's experiences in the family, peer
group, school, and other settings are highly likely to influence the course
of his development.18 4 And third, adolescence is a period during which
many developmental characteristics become well-established and
increasingly difficult to alter. 85 Taken together, these factors imply that
the increased propensity for juvenile transfer to the adult criminal courts,
and incarceration in adult facilities, is imprudent because it forecloses the
possibility that psychologically flexible juvenile offenders will receive
the treatment necessary to prevent them from reoffending.
86
With respect to adjudicative competence, there is ample evidence to
suggest that adolescents under the age of fifteen are not competent to
participate in criminal trials. 87  Many juveniles have serious troubles
assisting counsel, entering pleas, and considering plea bargains in the
criminal courts. 88 These realities indicate that the increased propensity
for juvenile transfer is unsound policy. 1
89
Finally, the increased propensity for juvenile transfer is ill-advised
because juvenile offenders are generally less culpable for their crimes
than adult criminals.' 90 A person is culpable for the commission of a
crime if he committed the crime purposely, knowingly, or recklessly, and
183. Arredondo, supra note 180, at 14. Other than during infancy, there is probably
no period of human development that involves more rapid or pervasive transformations in
individual capabilities than adolescence. See DIANE E. PAPALIA, A CHILD'S WORLD:
INFANCY THROUGH ADOLESCENCE 563-64 (McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1975).
184. Arredondo, supra note 180, at 14. Unlike infancy, a period during which human
development is influenced primarily by biology, and unlike adulthood, by which time
most intellectual, physical, emotional, and social development is complete, adolescence is
a period during which development is heavily influenced by changes in the environment.
Steinberg, supra note 180, at 53.
185. Arredondo, supra note 180, at 14. Events that occur in adolescence often have a
significant impact on adulthood, including events related to physical health, family
formation, and interpersonal relationships. See PAPALIA, supra note 183, at 538-39.
186. Steinberg, supra note 180, at 57. Steinberg emphasizes that it is not possible to
draw generalizations about the likelihood of juvenile rehabilitation as a function of the
offender's age. Id. As such, he staunchly opposes laws that prevent transfer decisions
from being made on a case-by-case basis. Id.
187. Id. at 55. Among individuals age fifteen and younger, scores on standardized
adjudicative competence tests generally fall into the range in which competence is
deemed questionable by experts. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. Steinberg contends that no juvenile under the age of thirteen is competent to
stand trial in a criminal court, and that the competence of juveniles between the ages of
thirteen and seventeen should be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id.
190. Arredondo, supra note 180, at 14.
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with some correlative ability to form reasonable expectations of the
potential consequences of his actions.191 Most juveniles do not exhibit
these characteristics before the age of twelve, and some do not exhibit
them even at the age of seventeen.1 92 Because juveniles tend not to
exhibit these characteristics, they are less culpable for their crimes than
adult criminals and, therefore, the increased propensity for juvenile
transfer to state criminal court systems, which has caused harsh penalties
to be inflicted upon juveniles, does not constitute sound public policy.
1 93
VI. Conclusion
Historically, the juvenile courts have existed to intervene when
children are accused of committing crimes, and in so doing to help
rehabilitate children in need. 194  However, many Americans have
recently begun to support prosecuting juvenile offenders in state criminal
court systems rather than in the juvenile courts.1 95 By supporting state
statutes that make it easier to prosecute juveniles in state criminal court
systems, Americans operate under the broad assumption that placing
juveniles in criminal courts will create a general deterrent effect on
juvenile offenders, which will, in turn, protect the public by causing a
reduction in juvenile crime rates.'
1 96
Unfortunately, the increased propensity for juvenile transfer in
Pennsylvania, which came in the form of Act 33,197 has failed to create a
general deterrent effect, inasmuch as juvenile arrest rates and
delinquency case rates, including delinquency case rates for person
offenses, have not decreased in Pennsylvania since the implementation of
Act 33.198 Moreover, two recent studies reveal that the harsher
191. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 314 (7th ed. 2000). Also, culpability sometimes
implies certain capabilities that are interpersonal or emotional in nature, including the
ability to control impulses, to manage behavior when pressured by others to violate the
law, and to avoid potentially problematic situations. Steinberg, supra note 180, at 56.
Very little is known about the development of these social and emotional capabilities in
juveniles. Id.
192. Id. Moreover, few individuals demonstrate adult-like psychological maturity
and, consequently, adult-like judgment before age seventeen. Id.
193. Id. at 57. Steinberg proposes that when a juvenile is prosecuted in a state
criminal court system, developmentally-normative immaturity should be added to the list
of possible mitigating factors, along with self-defense, mental state, and extenuating
circumstances. Id.
194. See RUBIN, supra note 24, at 54.
195. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 20, at
89.
196. Does Treating Kids Like Adults Make A Difference?, supra note 15.
197. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. Act 1995-33 (West).
198. See generally Nat'l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Pennsylvania Electronic Juvenile
Justice Databook, at http://ncjj.servehttp.com/padatabook (last updated July 2003)
(illustrating the lack of reduction in juvenile crime rates in Pennsylvania after the
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punishments inflicted upon juveniles by criminal courts have not
deterred juveniles prosecuted in state criminal court systems from
recidivating upon being released into society. 199 Further, researchers
assert that the increased propensity for juvenile transfer is perilous in
light of the psychological development of most juveniles.
200
Taking into account these policy arguments, Pennsylvania should
repeal the 1996 amendments to its Juvenile Code, which were created by
Act 33, and thereby restore a lower propensity for juvenile transfer to its
criminal court system. Doing so will show that Pennsylvanians have not
given up on the juvenile courts nor lost faith that troubled young people
are capable of rehabilitation. In the words of one Pennsylvania court:
[When loss is caused by a juvenile], moral outrage causes us to cry
out for a punishment that satisfies the moment, and which hopefully
satisfies our anger at our loss. However, it is that same sense of
morality and character that demands a dispositional determination
that both befit the unconscionable behavior of [the juvenile] and the
requirements of the law. The guiding tenet of our judicial process
requires that we respond in a manner that, while it ma not seem fair
or satisfactory to some, fulfills the mandates of justice.
enactment of Act 33).
199. See Fagan, supra note 161, at 100; Bishop, supra note 162, at 183.
200. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 180, at 57.
201. In re Clarke, 61 Pa. D. & C.4th 263, 279 (Pa. Corn. P1. 2003).
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